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Hauff: USOC May Enforce Its Rights in Olympic Without Proof of Confusion

SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE: USOC MAY ENFORCE ITS RIGHTS IN
OLYMPIC WITHOUT PROOF OF CONFUSION
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,
the United States Supreme Court held that the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) could enforce its statutory rights in the mark OLYMPIC without proving likelihood of customer confusion.2 Because this holding extended the USOC's
trademark rights beyond those engendered by the Lanham Act, the Court was
compelled to subject those rights to constitutional scrutiny.' The Court's holding
prevented San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) from using the word
4
OLYMPIC to promote the "Gay Olympic Games."
6
The SFAA decision 5 will probably affect future analyses of trademark rights
and constitutional issues. The Supreme Court 7 not only construed the Amateur
Sports Act8 in such a way that the USOC need not show confusion as to SFAA's
use, but also held that the USOC's enforcement of its trademark right against
SFAA did not violate the first amendment 9

1107 S.Ct. 2971

(1987).

2

1d. at 2977. Under federal law, the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the Lanham Act, contains
comprehensive registration and enforcement provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1976). The fundamental basis
of federal trademark law is the concept of customer confusion, often known as likelihood of confusion. See,
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (S.D.N.Y., 1977) aff'd, 580 F.2d 44
(2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). The critical issue is "whether a substantial number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be mislead or confused as to the source of the different products."
The Lanham Act authorizes a civil remedy for any unauthorized use which "is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976).
3San FranciscoArts & Athletics, 107 S.Ct. at 2977.
4
1d. The "Gay Olympic Games" were to take place from August 28 to September 15, 1982 in San Francisco,
California. The Games were expected to draw hundreds of athletes from cities all over the world. They were
to closely parallel the traditional Olympic Games, including many of the same events: a torch carrying
ceremony, athlete procession, and the awarding of gold, silver and bronze medals to the winning athletes.
The 1982 event was ultimately held under the name "Gay Games I" and a total of 1300 men and women from
twelve countries, twenty-seven states, and 139 cities participated. Additionally, the "Gay Games II"were
held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes from seventeen countries participating.
5
1d.
6The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof adopted and
used by manufacturers or merchants to distinguish their goods from those manufactured or sold by others.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). Trademarks may be enforced under theories of common, state or federal law. See,
J. MCCARTHY. TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION" § 5.2 (1984); Model State Trademark Bill Section
11 (1964); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1976).
According to McCarthy, trademarks generally perform four functions and confusion may occur as to each
function. The four functions are: (1)
to identify one seller's goods and distinguish them from goods sold by
others; (2) to indicate the source of origin of the goods, which may be anonymous; (3) to signify that all goods
bearing the mark are of an equal level of quality; and (4) to advertise and sell goods. See J. MCCARTHY.
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,
7

§ 3:1-3:3 (1984).

Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justices Rhenquist, White, Stevens, and Scalia
joined. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Justice Blackmun
joined. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
836 U.S.C. § 380 (1988).
9

San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2971.
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Finally, since the court did not consider the USOC to be a government entity, it held that enforcing USOC's OLYMPIC mark rights did not violate the fifth
amendment. 10
FACTS

The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) sued San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) to enjoin SFAA's use of the word OLYMPIC to promote the "Gay Olympics." " The
plaintiffs originally sought relief on a variety of theories, but the Court only considered their claim that SFAA violated the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.12
In mid-1981, SFAA13 originally sought to incorporate in California under the
name "Golden Gate Olympic Association." 14 The California Department of Corporations informed SFAA that the word "Olympic" could not be used in a corporate title.' 5 On November 4, 1981, SFAA filed for incorporation under its present name of San Francisco Arts & Athletics. 16 Thereafter, SFAA began to promote the "Gay Olympic Games." SFAA utilized the words "Gay Olympic
Games" on its letterheads, mailings, and in local newspapers. t8 SFAA sold Tshirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the title "Gay
Olympic Games" to cover costs of the event. 9
'7

As early as September, 1981, SFAA's president was indirectly informed of
the USOC's 20 concern over the potential trademark infringement of the OLYMPIC mark.2 ' Thereafter, the USOC communicated its position directly to SFAA
and demanded that SFAA terminate its use of the OLYMPIC mark. 2 The USOC
based its position on the Amateur Sports Act of 19783 On January 18, 1982, SFAA
'Old. at 2986. Only five members of the Court supported this holding. Justices Marshall, Brennan, O'Connor and Blackmun dissented.
I IInternational Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1983).
' 2 Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 371-96 (1982)).
13SFAA is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of California. SFAA was the principal sponsor and organizer of the "Gay Olympic Games." Various individuals associated with SFAA were also named
as defendants, including its president, Thomas F Waddell, who also served as Chairman of the proposed "Gay
Olympic Games.'"
14San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2975.
5

1 1d.

' 6 International Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts, 219 U.S.P.Q. 982, 983 (N.D. Cal 1982).
17San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2975.
18 1d.
9

I 1d.
20

The USOC is a private, nonprofit corporation duly chartered and existing under the laws of the United States
viz. 36 U.S.C. § 371-396 (1988). The USOC was first incorporated and granted a federal charter in 1950. Pub.
L. No. 81-805, 64 Stat. 899 (1950). USOC's predecessors have existed since 1896.
21 InternationalOlympic Committee, 212 U.S.P.Q. at 983.
22

1d. at 982.

23In particular,

USOC's claim came under Section 110 of the Act, set forth in 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1988), which
provides:
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss1/6
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agreed to discontinue use of the mark OLYMPIC and substituted the term 'Athletic." 24 But SFAA subsequently resumed use of the mark OLYMPIC, contend25
ing that the USOC was acting in a discriminatory and unconstitutional manner.
The USOC filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California on August 9, 1982.26 On the same day, the USOC sought a temporary
27
restraining order which Judge Conti granted.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction, 28 which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed z9 Eventually, the district court granted summary judgment, awarded a permanent injunction to the USOC, and entered an
award of attorney fees to USOC. 30 The court of appeals affirmed the summary
(a) Without consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of
any goods or services, or to induce the sale of any goods or services to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition (1) the symbol of the [IOC], consisting of five interlocking rings;
(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief;
(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing association by, the
[IOC] or the [USOC]; or
(4) the words "Olympic;' "Olympiad," "Citius Altius Fortius;' or any combination thereof tending
to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the
[USOCI or any Olympic activity shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for
the remedies provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the
Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976)]. However, any person who
actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21,
1950, shall not be prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who actually used or whose
assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade name, sign, symbol or insignia described
in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950
shall not be prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose
and for the same goods or services.
(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or services to use the trade name
of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, symbol, insignia, or emblem of the [OC] or of the [USOCI
in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were donated, supplied, or furnished to
or for the use of, approved, selected, or used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or PanAmerican team or team members.
(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name "United States Olympic Committee;" the
symbol described in subsection (a)(1) of this section; and the words "Olympic," "Olympiad,"
"Citius Altius Fortius" or any combination thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in
subsection (a) of this section.
2
4San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2976.
25
SFAA also contacted the Northern California chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). InternationalOlympic Committee, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 983. The ACLU confirmed SFAA's contention regarding
discriminatory action and offered to defend SFAA should the USOC bring suit against it. Id.
26
The USOC and IOC originally brought claims under the International Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property and for unfair competition (15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (1976)), for violation of the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978 (36 U.S.C. § 371 (1988)), for federal trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976), for false
designation of origin, false description or representation (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976)), for breach of contract
between the parties, and for dilution of plaintiff's distinctive marks (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330).
27
1nternational Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 982, 984 (N.D.
Cal. 1982).
28/d

.

29

International Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics., 707 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1983).
30219 U.S.P.Q. 982. The district court awarded attorney fees to the USOC under the Amateur Sports Act, 36
U.S.C. §by
380(a)
(1988), which subjects
a violator "to suit in a civil action [by USOC] for the remedies proPublished
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1989
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judgment and permanent injunction, but reversed and remanded the award of at3
torney fees. '
The appellate court found that the Amateur Sports Act granted the USOC
exclusive use of the word OLYMPIC without requiring that the USOC prove the
unauthorized use was confusing. 32 Further, the court found that SFAA was not
entitled to defenses available to an entity sued for a trademark violation under the
Lanham Act. 33 The court did not address SFAA's contention that the USOC enforced its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court found that the
USOC was not a state actor.34 Finally, the appellate court rejected SFAA's first
amendment challenge, because it found that SFAA had satisfactory alternative
means for expressing its opinion and had no first amendment right35to use OLYMPIC or the Olympic symbols to promote its games or products.
The court of appeals denied SFAA's petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc. 36 Three judges dissented from the denial for rehearing, findinterpretation of the Amateur Sports Act raised serious first
ing that the panel's 37
amendment issues.
vided in the Trademark Act." Under the Trademark Act, or Lanham Act, the court "in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 15U.S.C. § 1117 (1982). The district court awarded
attorney fees on the theory that SFAA had intentionally used the mark OLYMPIC in a manner that violated
the statute knowing that it risked such a violation.
31International Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986).
As to the issue of attorney fees, the Court found the word "may" in the Lanham Act provision regarding attorney fees had generally been construed as giving the court discretionary authority as to attorney fees even
when the violator's conduct fits within the statutory definition of exceptional circumstances. Id. at 738. The
Court then found that although Local Rule 270 of the Northern District if California requiring discussions
between the parties and declarations by the movant as to attorney fees had not been complied with, SFAAs
failure to cooperate required that the district court's ruling be regarded as an implicit finding that the local
rule had been waived. Id. at 739. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals remanded the issue of attorney fees to
the District Court to determine how much of USOC's counsels work was reasonably necessary under the controlling precedent. Id.
32
1d. at 736.
331d
.

34

d. at 736-37.
3
11d. at 737.
36

International Olympic Committee v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1986).
1d. Judge Kozinski filed the dissenting opinion in which Judges Pregerson and Norris joined. Particularly, the dissenters found troubling SFAA's challenge to the power of Congress to privatize the word OLYMPIC, thereby making it unutterable by others in connection with any product, public event or to promote a
cause. Judge Kozinski queried, "If Congress has the power to grant a crown monopoly in the word Olympic, one wonders how many other words or concepts can be similarly enclosed, and the extent to which our
public discourse can thereby be impoverished." Id. at 1323. Judge Kozinski's first amendment concerns were
enhanced by the way in which the USOC allegedly exercised its "stewardship over the word Olympic." He
stated:
[l]t seems that the USOC is using its control over the term Olympic to promote the very image of
homosexuals that the SFAA seeks to combat: handicapped, juniors, police, Explorers, even dogs are
allowed to carry the Olympic torch, but homosexuals are not. Troublesome as would be a total
withdrawal of the term from public discourse, an exclusion that is invoked pursuant to a subjective assessment of the wholesomeness of the proposed speaker or proprietary of the proposed message is more
troublesome still.
37

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss1/6
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When petitioning for certiorari, SFAA claimed that the Ninth Circuit ignored
the Amateur Sports Act's "plain language and history." 3 8 SFAA contended, "The
language employed by Congress in Section 380, and its ordinary meaning under
the Lanham Act dictates the simple conclusion that Congress bestowed an OLYMPIC trademark upon USOC enforceable under terms of pre-existing trademark
law." 39 SFAA argued that the court of appeals should have adopted a narrower
view of the Act to avoid first and fourteenth amendment problems. 40
When opposing certiorari, the USOC claimed that SFAA "artificially
[sought] to force the rights provided by Section 380 into the framework of a traditional 'trademark' and then attack[ed] those rights because they fail to fit that
framework." 4' The USOC contended that Section 380 "does not duplicate the
trademark laws; it stands on its own." 4 2 The USOC maintained that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 380 did not impinge on first amendment rights,
because the decision did not prevent SFAA "from commenting upon or protesting
against the Olympics." 43 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the statutory and constitutional issues 4
In its brief on the merits, SFAA argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision sanctioned a "logically unconscionable outcome" because it permitted the USOC to
silence only those uses of OLYMPIC which were offensive to the USOC "without
regard to traditional trademark or constitutional considerations." 45 SFAA advanced both statutory and constitutional positions. It argued that Congress never
meant to give the USOC such "unbridled and dangerous powers." 46 SFAA stated
that had Congress given the USOC such broad powers, Section 380 would violate
7
first amendment and equal protection rights
The USOC countered that a "clearer violation of [Section 380] was difficult
to imagine." 48 The USOC relied on Section 380's construction and legislative
history to support its positions 9 The USOC contended that the phrase "or any
combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion," appearing in
paragraph (a)(4) of the statute does not require the USOC to prove confusion in
all cases, but only in cases involving any combination or simulation of the Olympic
3833 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 228, 338 (1987).
39 Id.
40/d.

41 Id.
42

1d. at 338-39.
1d. at 339.
44San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 312-13.
4533 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 338, 339 (1987).
43

46Id.
47

Id.

481d.

49Id. by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
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marks. 50 The USOC insisted that SFAA's interpretation ignored usual punctuation rules, saying that the legislature would have placed a comma after "thereof,"'
5
had it expected the USOC to prove likelihood of confusion in all cases. ' The
USOC insisted that SFAAs interpretation contraindicated paragraph (c) of the
52
statute, which gave the USOC the exclusive right to use the mark OLYMPIC.
The USOC argued that Section 380's legislative history clearly indicated that
the confusion provision referred only to the prohibition added to the prior criminal
Olympic marks and made no
statute, which applied only to the direct use of the
53
defenses.
infringement
trademark
for
provision
54
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
HOLDING AND OPINION

At the outset of the majority opinion, the Court noted that "the starting point
in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 55 The Court
found that the language of Section 380(a) 56 indicated that the confusion language
modified only "any combination or simulation thereof" and did not apply to the
word OLYMPIC itself.5 7 The Court also found that the legislative history of the
section supported this interpretation 58 The Court felt that Section 3 80's reference
to Lanham Act remedies did not incorporate the traditional trademark defenses
and would render the statute superfluous, considering the USOC's existing
trademark in OLYMPIC.5 9 Therefore, the Court concluded that the protection afforded the USOC's use of their Olympic words and symbols differed from nor0

5 1d.
51

I d. ; See supra note 23.

521d.

531d. The prior criminal statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be confusing. Instead the statute
made it a crime for "any person.., other than [the USOC] ...for the purpose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and competition.., or for any business or charitable purpose to use.., the words
'Olympic,' 'Olympiad,' or 'Citius Altius Fortius' or any combination of these words." 64 Stat. 901, 36 U.S.C.
§ 379 (1976).
54See 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 587, 588-89 (1987).
55San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S.Ct. at 2976 (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 497 U.S. 36 (1986),
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).
56See supra note 23.
"San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2977.
58ld. In particular, the Court found that the changes incorporated into Section 380 as compared to its
predecessor criminal statute, (see, e.g., supra note 42), were largely in response to a letter from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office. The letter explained:
Section l10(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the words "Olympic," "Olympiad," "Citius Altius
Fortius," and any combinations thereof, but also any simulation or confusingly similar derivation thereof
tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the
[USOC] or any Olympic activity. ...
Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some
new prohibitions, e.g. words described in section (a)(4) tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake,
or to deceive with respect to the [USOCI or any Olympic activity.
Id.
591d. at 2977-78.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss1/6

6

Hauff: USOC May Enforce Its Rights in Olympic Without Proof of Confusion
Summer, 1988]

NOTES

mal trademarks in two respects: first, the USOC need not prove that a contested
use is likely to cause confusion; and second, an unauthorized user does not have
60
the normal statutory defenses available.
The Court rejected SFAA's argument that the word OLYMPIC was generic
and therefore incapable of trademark protection.6 ' The Court explained that Congress could have reasonably found that the commercial and promotional value
of the word OLYMPIC was the product of the USOC's "own talents and energy,
the end result of much time, effort, and expense" and concluded that the USOC
could constitutionally obtain a limited property right in the word. 62
The Court rejected SFAA's argument that the first amendment prohibited
Congress from granting exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the authorized user prove confusion. 63 Considering that the first amendment provides
only a limited form of protection for commercial speech, the Court felt that Congress was reasonable in deciding not to require that the USOC to prove confu64
sion .
The Court noted that neither Congress, nor the USOC prohibited SFAA from
conveying its message by prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes.6 5
The Court characterized the Act's restrictions on expressive speech as incidental to the primary Congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding the
USOC's activities, and therefore only required that the incidental restrictions not
be greater than necessary to further a substantial governmental interest.66
The Court found a substantial governmental interest existed, since the USOC
promotes the participation of United States amateur athletes in the "great fouryearly sports festival, the Olympic Games." 67 The Court concluded that the Act's
restrictions were not broader than necessary to further those governmental in68
terests.
60
61

62

d. at 2978.
Id. at 2979.
d. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad Casting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)).
1d. at 2980.

63
64

/d. at 2980-82. (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968, 2976
(1986)); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980).
65
1d. at 2980-81. The Court noted that SFAA held its athletic event in its planned format under the names
"Gay Games I" and "Gay Games II" in 1982 and 1986 respectively. Id. at 2981; International Olympic Committee, 781 F.2d at 736.
66d. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
67
d. at 2981-82.
61Id. at 2982. Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's interpretation of Section 380, and insisted that the statute was overbroad on its face, and therefore incapable of withstanding first
amendment analysis. Id. at 2994 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended because the Court's
construction of Section 380 prohibited even non-confusing uses of OLYMPIC it regulated an "extraordinary
amount of noncommercial speech." Id. at 2996. Justice Brennan added the absence of statutory defenses under
Section 380, as interpreted by the Court, leads to the regulation of a substantial amount of noncommercial
speech. Id. In view of this substantial regulation, Justice Brennan insisted that the statute violated the first
amendment
by prohibiting the dissemination
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1989
of a message for which there was no adequate translation. Id.
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SFAA argued that the USOC had enforced its rights in a discriminatory
69
fashion in violation of the fifth amendment. The Court did not reach the merits
of this claim because it found that the USOC was neither a governmental actor
70
itself, nor was it acting in a symbiotic relationship with the government.
The Court indicated that the facts in this case simply were not sufficiently
dispositive to establish governmental action, notwithstanding the fact that Congress had granted the USOC's charter, that Congress extensively regulated the
USOC's activities, and that Congress had granted the USOC's exclusive use of

the mark OLYMPIC for the purported purpose of aiding the USOC in obtaining funding!?I The Court acknowledged that governmental action had traditionally
been found when the challenged entity performed functions that were "traditional72
ly the exclusive prerogative" of the federal government. However, the Court
found that "neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been
a traditional governmental function." 73 While the activities of the USOC certainly
served a viable national interest, the Court felt that governmental action was not
established merely when a private entity performed a function which served the
74
public.
at 2998. Moreover, Justice Brennan found that the governmental interest in providing a subsidy to the USOC
was such that the statute's incidental restrictions on first amendment freedoms were greater than necessary
to further that interest. Id. at 2999.
69
d. at 2984. The Court noted in a footnote that although SFAA had invoked the fourteenth amendment for
its discriminatory enforcement claim, it did not apply as the claimed association was between the USOC and
the federal government. Finding that the fifth amendment would apply, that SFAA had raised the issue of
discriminatory enforcement in its petition for certiorari, and that both parties had fully briefed the issue, the
Court addressed the claim as one under the fifth amendment. Id.at 2984 & n.21.
70
Id. at 2984. While not reaching the merits of SFAA's discriminatory claim, the Court noted that the claim
was "far from compelling." Id.at 2984 & n.22. The Court noted that as of 1982 the USOC had brought twentytwo opposition to trademark applications and one petition to cancel, as well as a number of additional suits
against various businesses. Further, the Court noted that the USOC authorized uses of OLYMPIC directly
related to the purposes of the USOC as established by it charter. In particular, the Court noted sections (7)
and (13) of 36 U.S.C. § 374 (1988). 36 U.S.C. § 374(7) provides that one of the objects and purposes of the
USOC is to:
[Aissist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the development of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes. 36 U.S.C. § 374(13) provides that another purpose of the USOC is to [Elencourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible, the expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by
handicapped individuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals.
The authorized uses included the "Special Olympics" for handicapped persons, the "Junior Olympics" and
"Explorer Olympics" for youths.
"7
Id. at 2985. Particularly, the Court stated that the fact that Congress granted USOC's charter did not render
it a government agent, since the government grants all corporate charters; that extensive regulation of the USOC
did not transform USOC's actions into those of the government, (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974)); and that government subsidies to trademark owners, whose actions were private, did
not impart to the government constitutional responsibility for the entity's actions, (citing Blum v. Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982)).
72

1d. (citing Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974)).
73
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987), (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830, 842
(1982)).
74
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss1/6
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Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion,75 contended that the challenged
action constituted government action.7 6 He insisted that the USOC itself was a
governmental actor because Congress had endowed the USOC with governmental
powers to enable it to perform a traditional governmental function. 7 7 The USOC
represents the United States to the world community 78 While Olympic participation is avowedly nonpolitical, Justice Brennan argued it was "inescapably nationalist." 79 The Court disagreed, and explained that the USOC's role in representing the nation to the world community could not be termed "traditionally governmental" because it was not subject to government control.8 0
Justice Brennan referred to the sequence of events leading to the United States'
boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow to illustrate USOC's
governmental role.8 Again, the Court disagreed, and insisted that governmental influence on that decision was "hardly representative in view of the absence
of such influence on the vast majority of decisions." 8 2 Moreover, the Court pointed
of those events a district court had found that there was
out that even in the course
83
no governmental action
The court acknowledged that governmental action could normally be found
in cases where the government exercised coercive power, or such significant encouragement over a decision that the decision, as a matter of law, had to be deemed
that of the government.8 4 However, in this case, the Court found no evidence of
such governmental conduct, and therefore concluded that the USOC's enforce85
ment of its exclusive OLYMPIC rights was simply not a governmental decision.
Justice Brennan disagreed, and insisted that apart from USOC's role as a governmental actor, the Court could find government action because the "USOC and
75Id. at 2987. Justice Marshall also signed Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, and on this point Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred.
76
1d.
771d

.

78 1d. at 2988.
79Id.

80Id. at 2985 & n.27.
81

Id.at 2989. The United States boycott stemmed from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Justice Brennan
characterized the sequence of events prior to the making of the ultimate decision: first, the President publicly
opposed American participation in his State of the Union Address; second, Congress voiced opposition to
American participation; and, finally, the President threatened legal action to enforce the administration's position. Justice Brennan characterized the USOC's ultimate decision to boycott as follows:
Shortly, thereafter, with national and international stakes of the USOC's decision set forth by the President and Congress, and with reports in the press of possible cuts in federal aid to the USOC, the USOC
announced that the United States would not participate in the 1980 Olympic Games.

Id.
8

1Id.

at 2985-86 & n.27.
83/d. at 2986 (citing DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.D.C.) aff'd
mem., 226 U.S. App. D.C. 210, 710 F.2d 221 (1980) (holding that mere Presidential, administrative, or political
pressure could not be equated with control)).
84
1d. at 2986 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840).

85
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federal government exist in a'symbiotic relationship sufficient to provide a nexus
between the USOC's challenged action and the government." 86 To illustrate this
relationship, Justice Brennan cited the mutual benefits the relationship conferred
on each party, the profound connection between the United States and the USOC
in the public eye,8 7 the close financial link between the USOC's alleged

discriminatory exercise of its word use authority, and the financial success of both
the USOC and the government 8 Justice Brennan felt this close connection compelled a finding of government action 9 Still, the Court found that the USOC was

not a governmental actor, and reasoned that SFAA's discrimination claim "must
fail." 90
ANALYSIS

The Court's interpretation of Section 380 appears correct 9 ' Section 380's
statutory construction and legislative history support the proposition that the
USOC is entitled to enforce its exclusive statutory rights in OLYMPIC without
proving likelihood of confusion. 2 Consequently, the USOC's statutory rights to
its Olympic marks are broader than the rights afforded to the holders of traditional
trademarks. It is a well accepted tenet of the Supreme Court's censorship cases
that the prohibition of particular words runs the substantial risk of suppressing
ideas.9 3 Yet, the Court properly balanced the restrictions which the statute imposed on first amendment freedoms to determine whether they were greater than

necessary to further a substantial government interest.
Prior cases dealing with the Amateur Sports Act had characterized its primary
purpose, and therefore the government's primary interest, as being financial,
namely to "ensure the market value of license." 94 Justice Brennan adopted this
86

/d. at 2991-92.
In particular, Justice Brennan noted that the United States President has served as Honorary President of
the USOC, that the national flag flies "figuratively and literally" over the Olympic Team, and that the athletes'
devotion was to the nation and not the the USOC. San FranciscoArt & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2992.
87

88

1d.

89

/d. at 2993. To Justice Brennan the fact that Congress had reshaped the USOC in 1978, purportedly under
Section 380, in part to fill a role which no private party had ever held illustrated USOC's governmental role.
This role was that of exclusive national coordinator for all amateur athletes related to international competition. Justice Brennan concluded that because Congress had bestowed upon the USOC these "inherently public
powers and responsibilities" the USOC's actions should be subject to constitutional restraints. Id. at 2991.
90
d. at 2986-87. The Court noted that SFAA also contended that governmental action could be found in the
District Court's entry of the injunction under the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948). However,
because SFAA had not raised this contention in its petition for certiorari, the Court concluded that the issue
was not properly before the Court under Supreme Court Rule 21.1(a). Id. at 2987 & n.30.
9' See supra notes 55-60.
92
The text of the statute clearly supports the interpretation advanced by the USOC and adopted by the Court.
See supra note 50. Further, the letter from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, also supports this
interpretation. See supra note 58.
93
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971): "We cannot indulge the facile assumption that one
can forbid particular words without running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."
94
Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); See also,
United States Olympic Committee v. Interlicense Corporation, S. A., 737 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1984) and cases
cited therein.
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position in his dissent, and argued that the traditional Lanham Act rights were
sufficient to promote this interest.9 5
The Court recognized USOC's financial interest, but indicated that it was
but one of the governmental interests advanced by the statute and urged that there
were broader public issues at stake. 6 The Court concluded that Congress' determination as to the scope of the statute's restrictions was reasonable. 9 7 To support
this belief the Court stated:
Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing. It also could determine
that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the
distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the marks.98
Interestingly, the Court used the likelihood of confusion and the dilution
doctrines9 9 to conclude that the restrictions of Section 380 are not unnecessarily overbroad to further the government's interest.1 00 The Court appears to argue
that Congress has a legitimate interest in protecting the OLYMPIC symbol,
through the USOC, in whatever manner Congress determines. Ostensibly, this
is the fundamental basis of Justice Brennan's dissent contending that the statute
is constitutionally overbroad. t0 l The Court's only response to Justice Brennan's
concerns is, "we find no 'realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protection of parties not before the
Court' . . . Accordingly, we decline to apply the overbreadth doctrine to this
case." 102 The Court's analysis fails to explain why this danger is not realistic in
view of Congress' alleged unbridled power.10 3 However, considering SFAA's commercialization of goods bearing the mark, as well as its clear attempt to exploit
the imagery and goodwill in OLYMPIC, the Court's result appears appropriate.
Considering the inadequacy of the Court's opinion on this point, Section 380
has probably not been purged of all first amendment concerns, and first amendment problems may arise if litigants show their rights are being, or have been,
compromised. First amendment claims based on the denial of expressionary
10 4
speech would also appear to remain viable.
95 San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2999-3000.
96
1d. at 2981; see supra note 68.

91 San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2982.
99id.
"The dilution doctrine is essentially set out in the second sentence of the Court's language, viz. the statement that unauthorized use harms [dilutes] the distinctiveness and commercial value of the mark. Id.
00
'
San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2982.
'0 1 d. at 2987; see supra note 68.
02
San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2981 & n.15 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
"°3See supra notes 37, 46 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Court's holding on the fifth amendment issue, and in particular,
in regard to the question of governmental action, also appears correct, absent consideration of the Court's enforcement of a putative discriminatory injunction under
the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer.t05 Despite Justice Brennan's persuasive reasoning to the contrary, the actions of the USOC are sufficiently independent of the
government. 0 6 One might wonder, however, if the Court failed to find govern07
ment action to avoid the merits of SFAA's discrimination claim.
IMPLICATIONS

Trademark Law
Because Section 380 is unique to the USOC and its OLYMPIC symbols and
marks, the impact of the Court's decision would appear to be limited to cases in
which the USOC seeks to enforce its exclusive rights. In this regard, however,
the Court's purported determinative test may render many first amendment issues
under Section 380 viable and unanswered. 0 8 Particularly, inasmuch as the Court's
opinion does not expressly prohibit expressionary uses of Olympic marks, 10 9 as
well it probably should not, it is likely that future litigation under Section 380
will be replete with the unauthorized user claiming first amendment rights to
freedom of expression.
The Court's opinion will probably have minimal effect on first amendment
issues under the traditional likelihood of confusion doctrine. When the likelihood
of confusion doctrine is employed as the primary basis of liability for unauthorized
use, trademark protection generally does not raise constitutional problems. This
is because the government has a legitimate interest in curtailing deceptive or
misleading communications." "ITherefore, the first amendment does not operate
10 5 The Court noted, apparently with approval, that in Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F. Supp. at 1118-21, the
district court found that the Act did not prohibit the use of the Olympic logo of five interlocking rings and
the Olympic torch in a poster expressing opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic village at Lake
Placid, New York into a prison. San FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 2981 & n.14.
106 Moreover, the Court's holding is consistent with those of other courts considering the same issue. For example, in DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (1980), relied upon by the
majority, supra note 83, the district court arrived at the same result. In so doing, the district court relied on
the circuit court's test which had been consistently applied to determine when federal jurisdiction attached
in nondiscrimination cases. Under the circuit court's test, the focus is on the quantum of government involvement with a private entity which is necessary to indicate that the private entity is sufficiently entangled with
governmental functions to be considered a governmental actor. The circuit court had advanced the following notion as a principal evolved from its prior cases: "At least where race is not involved, it is necessary
to show that the government exercises some form of control over the actions of the private party." Spark v.
Catholic Univ. of America, 520 F.2d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Because the USOC is an independent body
with no provisions in its charter giving the government control, the district court had found that such control was lacking. See DeFrantz, 492 F.Supp. at 1194.
07
See supra note 70 and accompanying text. It would appear that for a future party to successfully raise a
discrimination claim not only would they have to show that the USOC was a governmental actor, but also
that their use fell within the purview of one of the USOC's stated purposes. See 36 U.S.C. § 374 (1988).
10 8 See supra notes 63-68 and 94-103 and accompanying text.
109 See Slop the Olympic Prison, 489 F Supp. at 1120; See supra note 105.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss1/6
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as a restriction on trademark rights under the confusion theory.
The Court's opinion will probably indirectly effect other cases as well. The
decision may affect trademark parody cases which often raise first amendment
concerns, as well as trademark infringement cases involving the application of
the misappropriation doctrine and/or the dilution doctrine.'
ConstitutionalLaw
The Supreme Court's rejection of government action on behalf of the USOC
is likely to have a significant effect on future civil rights cases brought under either
the fifth or fourteenth amendments. In Stevens v. New York Racing Association, 112
a recent civil rights case the New York District Court distinguished the SFAA decision. The Stevens court found a symbiotic relationship between the state and the
private entity, saying the state was sufficiently involved with the private entity's
activities and significantly encouraged their actions." t3 The Stevens court concluded that "the facts in USOC are not as suggestive of a symbiotic relationship
as those in the instant case." ,"4The Stevens court distinguished the SFAA decision on three bases: (1) the defendant in that case [New York Racing Association
(NYRA)] transferred monies to the state, whereas the USOC does not provide
Congress with any monies; (2) the state could exert influence over NYRA's decisions concerning press credentials and the challenged action, whereas neither
Congress, nor the President possessed power to control the USOC's actions; and,
(3) while nothing in the Supreme Court's decision indicated that Congress could
approve or remove USOC's directors or that USOC's assets would be transferred
by a public official to a federal agency on dissolution of the USOC, the state
possessed the power to do both to the NYRA. i t5
Future courts will probably use the USOC's relationship to the federal government as a standard for comparing other government-private entity relationships.
Under this standard courts will likely require a significant level of involvement
between the private entity and the government before treating the private entity
as a governmental actor.
"Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or
misleading. Weforesee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem. The first amendment,
as we construe it today, does not prohibit the state from insuring that the streams of commercial information
flow cleanly as well as freely."
"'1See, e.g., Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: ConstitutionalImplications of the Emerging Rationalesfor
the Protectionof Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158 (1982). Denicola contends that emerging rationales,
such as the misappropriation rationale and the dilution rationale, implicate first amendment problems because
when these rationales are utilized where the traditional confusion rationale is not applicable. The putative
problems, Denicola suggests, are most prevalent when the trademark serves as a vehicle for the communication
of ideas. See also, Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A FairUse and FirstAmendment Analysis, 72 Va. L. Rev.
1078, 1117 (1986) (contending J. Koszinski's analysis is pertinent to the problem of trademark parody and first
amendment rights).
112665 F. Supp. 164, 174-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
3

t Id.
4

11d. at 175.
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CONCLUSION

In SFAA, the United States Supreme Court held that the USOC could enforce
its statutory rights in the mark OLYMPIC without needing to prove the likelihood
of customer confusion, and that its enforcement against SFAA did not violate the
first amendment." 16 Hence, SFAA could not use the word OLYMPIC to promote
its "Gay Olympic Games." This holding is likely to have little impact on trademark
law in general, because the USOC's statutory rights are bestowed by a statute
which is unique to the USOC.
The Court also held, over Justice Brennan's strong dissent, that the USOC's
enforcement of its OLYMPIC trademark rights did not violate the fifth amend17
ment, because the USOC was not a governmental actor.' This relatively narrow state action view will undoubtedly affect future civil rights litigation.
CHARLES

16
'
San

F

HAUFF, JR.

FranciscoArts & Athletics, Inc., 107 S. Ct. at 1971.

117 Id.
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